Files
muxplex/muxplex/auth.py
T
Brian Krabach d541612843 fix: read federation key live on each request and check PUT sync response
Bug 1 (auth.py): AuthMiddleware.dispatch() was using self.federation_key
(set once at startup) for Bearer token validation. If the key was generated
or rotated via POST /api/federation/generate-key after startup, the old
(often empty) value caused all federation auth to silently return 401.

Fix: import load_federation_key from muxplex.settings and call it fresh on
every non-exempt, non-cookie request. Also adds a warning log when a Bearer
token is received but no key is configured on this server.

Bug 2 (main.py): _sync_settings_with_remotes() discarded the PUT response,
silently swallowing 401/500 errors from the remote sync endpoint.

Fix: capture the PUT response as put_resp. Handle 409 (Conflict = remote is
newer) with a debug log; raise_for_status() for any other non-2xx so errors
propagate to the outer except and are logged as warnings.

Tests:
- test_dispatch_calls_load_federation_key_live: pattern test confirming
  load_federation_key() is called inside dispatch()
- test_dispatch_does_not_use_stale_self_federation_key_for_bearer: pattern
  test confirming self.federation_key is gone from the live bearer check
- test_sync_put_response_calls_raise_for_status: pattern test confirming
  raise_for_status() is called on the PUT response in the sync function
- Updated existing bearer tests to monkeypatch load_federation_key so they
  are isolated from any real key file on disk
2026-04-08 22:39:03 -07:00

246 lines
8.5 KiB
Python

"""
muxplex authentication — password and signing secret file management.
"""
import base64
import hmac
import logging
import secrets
from pathlib import Path
from itsdangerous import BadSignature, SignatureExpired, TimestampSigner
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.requests import Request
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
from muxplex.settings import load_federation_key
_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Config directory
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _config_dir() -> Path:
"""Return ~/.config/muxplex, creating it (mode 0700) if needed."""
d = Path.home() / ".config" / "muxplex"
d.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return d
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Password file management
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def get_password_path() -> Path:
"""Return the path to the password file: ~/.config/muxplex/password."""
return Path.home() / ".config" / "muxplex" / "password"
def load_password() -> str | None:
"""Read the password file if it exists, return None otherwise."""
path = get_password_path()
if not path.exists():
return None
return path.read_text().strip()
def generate_and_save_password() -> str:
"""Generate a random password, write it to the password file (0600), return it."""
pw = secrets.token_urlsafe(20)
path = get_password_path()
_config_dir() # ensures dir exists with mode 0700
path.write_text(pw + "\n")
path.chmod(0o600)
return pw
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Secret (signing key) management
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def get_secret_path() -> Path:
"""Return the path to the signing secret file: ~/.config/muxplex/secret."""
return Path.home() / ".config" / "muxplex" / "secret"
def load_or_create_secret() -> str:
"""Load the signing secret from file, or create one if it doesn't exist."""
path = get_secret_path()
if path.exists():
return path.read_text().strip()
secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
_config_dir() # ensures dir exists with mode 0700, consistent with generate_and_save_password()
path.write_text(secret + "\n")
path.chmod(0o600)
return secret
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session cookie signing / verification
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def create_session_cookie(secret: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> str:
"""Create a signed, timestamped session cookie value."""
signer = TimestampSigner(secret)
# ttl_seconds is not used at signing time; the timestamp is embedded in
# the signed value and checked against ttl_seconds during verification.
return signer.sign("muxplex-session").decode()
def verify_session_cookie(secret: str, cookie: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> bool:
"""Verify a session cookie's signature and expiry. Returns True/False.
ttl_seconds=0 means session cookie — no server-side expiry check.
"""
signer = TimestampSigner(secret)
try:
max_age = ttl_seconds if ttl_seconds > 0 else None
signer.unsign(cookie, max_age=max_age)
return True
except (BadSignature, SignatureExpired):
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# PAM authentication
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def pam_available() -> bool:
"""Check whether the python-pam module is importable."""
try:
import pam # noqa: F401
return True
except ImportError:
return False
def authenticate_pam(username: str, password: str) -> bool:
"""Authenticate via PAM. Username must match the running process owner."""
import os
import pwd
import pam
running_user = pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid()).pw_name
if username != running_user:
return False
return pam.authenticate(username, password, service="login")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth middleware
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Paths that bypass auth (login page itself, static assets it needs)
_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS = {"/login", "/auth/mode", "/auth/logout", "/api/instance-info"}
# File extensions that are always served without auth — the login page needs
# its own CSS, JS, images, and fonts before the user has a session cookie.
_STATIC_EXTENSIONS = {
".css",
".js",
".json",
".svg",
".png",
".ico",
".woff",
".woff2",
".ttf",
".map",
}
# Socket-level localhost addresses — cannot be forged via HTTP headers
_LOCALHOST_ADDRS = {"127.0.0.1", "::1"}
class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""FastAPI middleware that enforces authentication on non-localhost requests."""
def __init__(
self,
app,
auth_mode: str,
secret: str,
ttl_seconds: int,
password: str = "",
federation_key: str = "",
):
super().__init__(app)
self.auth_mode = auth_mode
self.secret = secret
self.ttl_seconds = ttl_seconds
self.password = password
self.federation_key = federation_key
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next) -> Response:
# 1. Localhost bypass — client.host is the socket-level IP and cannot
# be forged by the client (unlike the HTTP Host header).
client_host = request.client.host if request.client else ""
if client_host in _LOCALHOST_ADDRS:
return await call_next(request)
# 2. Exempt paths (login page, auth endpoints)
if request.url.path in _AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS:
return await call_next(request)
# 3. Static assets — login page needs its CSS/JS/images before auth
path = request.url.path
if any(path.endswith(ext) for ext in _STATIC_EXTENSIONS):
return await call_next(request)
# 4. Valid session cookie
cookie = request.cookies.get("muxplex_session")
if cookie and verify_session_cookie(self.secret, cookie, self.ttl_seconds):
return await call_next(request)
# 4a. Bearer token (server-to-server federation).
# Read the key fresh from disk on every request so a key generated or
# rotated after startup (via POST /api/federation/generate-key) takes
# effect immediately without a server restart.
auth_header = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
if auth_header.lower().startswith("bearer "):
federation_key = load_federation_key()
if not federation_key:
_log.warning(
"federation: Bearer token received from %s but no key configured on this server",
client_host,
)
else:
token = auth_header[7:]
if hmac.compare_digest(token, federation_key):
return await call_next(request)
_log.warning("federation: rejected Bearer from %s", client_host)
# 5. Authorization: Basic header
auth_header = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
if auth_header.lower().startswith("basic "):
try:
# Strip "Basic " prefix (6 chars) before base64-decoding
decoded = base64.b64decode(auth_header[6:]).decode()
username, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
if self._check_credentials(username, pw):
return await call_next(request)
except Exception:
pass
return JSONResponse({"detail": "Invalid credentials"}, status_code=401)
# 6. No auth — redirect browsers, 401 for API clients
accept = request.headers.get("accept", "")
if "application/json" in accept:
return JSONResponse({"detail": "Authentication required"}, status_code=401)
return RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=307)
def _check_credentials(self, username: str, password: str) -> bool:
"""Validate credentials against the configured auth mode."""
if self.auth_mode == "pam":
return authenticate_pam(username, password)
return password == self.password